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THE "TRAVEL ACT":
A NEW STATUTORY APPROACH TO ORGANIZED CRIME
IN THE UNITED STATES
Herbert J. Miller, Jr.*
The role that the Federal Government should play in the control of
crime in a federal system continues to be one of the most perplexing
problems confronting all persons concerned with the administration of
justice in this country. Under our system of government, it is both
essential and desirable that the detection of crime and prosecution of
criminals be primarily state and local functions. But an increasing
crime rate, documented over the years by the statistical reports of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, has suggested that local authorities
need help from the Federal Government in the performance of their
law enforcement responsibilities.
Although the Constitutional basis for Federal criminal legislation
under the interstate commerce clause and other provisions of the Con-
stitution has been clear for many years,' the extent of such Federal
involvement has been the topic of extensive discussion. For example,
Attorney General Homer S. Cummings stated at the outset of the
1934 Attorney General's Conference on Crime that:
During recent years there has been an increasing demand
for the extension of federal power and an apparent assump-
tion that therein lies the remedy. Unfortunately, it is not a
problem which can be so easily solved. Just how far the
work of the federal department should go and just what the
form of interrelation between the agencies representing the
state and federal governments should be, is, of course, one
of the crucial questions which faces us in this Conference.
Implicit in this phase of the matter there are constitutional
* LL.B., George Washington University, 1949; B.A. George Washington
University, 1948; Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Criminal Division,
Department of Justice. The author wishes to express his appreciation to Mr.
Nathan Lewin, LL.B. 1960, Harvard Law School, for his assistance in the prepa-
ration of this article.
1. The sending of lottery tickets through the mails was prohibited as early
as 1890 (18 U.S.C. § 1302), and legislation forbidding the transportation of lottery
tickets in interstate commerce was enacted in 1895.
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questions and considerations of policy. Of this we may be
sure, there is an urgent demand for an adequate solution;
and an increasing necessity for the intimate and friendly
cooperation of all official agencies in determining the best
method of approach and in developing the most effective
means of administration of which we are capable. 2
The type of crime with which the 1934 Conference and the 73rd
Congress were concerned, was the crime of violence perpetrated by
armed gangs headed by notorious leaders, such as Dillinger and
"Baby Face" Nelson. During 1933 and 1934 Congress passed a group
of statutes, many of which had been requested by the Department of
Justice, directed against the interstate gangster. Among the statutes
enacted were a bank robbery law, 3 a law directed against extortion
threats sent in interstate commerce, 4 the Fugitive Felon Act,5 and
an amendment of the kidnapping statute. 6
During the next fifteen years, it became clearer that interstate
crime was adopting the financial and organizational techniques of
big business and still retaining the underworld methods of violence
and corruption. The Kefauver Committee of the 81st and 82nd Con-
gresses brought into full view the changing character of organized
crime in the United States. That Committee reported:
It cannot now be denied, as will appear more fully later in
the report, that the doubt which originally existed in the
minds of many intelligent and careful persons as to whether
crime is organized in the United States was in great measure
deliberately planted there. It was created by criminals who
have vast resources and incalculable power. They have
amassed and hoarded tremendous wealth out of the pro-
ceeds of their criminal activities and with it they have
sought to purchase respectability so that the true nature
of their operations would not become known. They have
insidiously cultivated the association of persons whose in-
tegrity and character are unquestionable. They have sought
membership in social clubs and other organizations where
they might acquire the status of respectability in their re-
spective communities. They have been lavish in their gifts
2. Proceedings of the Attorney General's Conference on Crime 4 (1934).
3. 48 Stat. 783; 12 U.S.C. § 588a-d (1934).
4. 48 Stat. 781; 18 U.S.C. § 408 d (1934).
5. 48 Stat. 782; 18 U.S.C. § 408 e (1934).
6. 48 Stat. 781; 18 U.S.C. § 408 a, b, c (1934). For a contemporaneous dis-
cussion of this legislation see Symposium, Extending Federal Powers Over
Crime, 1 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 399 (1934).
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to charity and they have publicly promoted philanthropies,
all in an effort to hide their crimes behind the shielding
cloak of respectability.
And to carry out this fiction, in many cases they have in-
vested in legitimate businesses so that they could always
point to these false fronts and claim that they were no
longer engaged in crime in the event that a question might
ever be raised as to their former criminal association. 7
It also was apparent to the Committee that gambling is the principal
source of income for organized crime and that approximately
$20,000,000,000 changed hands yearly as the result of illegal gambling
activities. s
The Attorney General's Conference on Organized Crime was held
on February 15, 1950 in Washington, D. C., at the suggestion of vari-
ous organizations of state and local officials to focus public attention
on the challenge to effective law enforcement presented by syndicated
criminal activity. Of the several legislative proposals recommended
by the Conference to enable the Federal Government to play a more
important role in controlling organized crime, only one became law-
the so-called Slot Machine Act. 9 However, this statute did not prove
as effective as was hoped, since the manufacturers were prompt in in-
venting new ingenious machines not coming within the purview of the
Act and which were more efficient in divesting the player of his money
than the "one-armed bandit."' 10
After a long legislative drought, the Eighty-Seventh Congress in
1961 contributed several new and significant weapons to the Federal
Government's law enforcement arsenal.11 Of these statutes perhaps
the most interesting and important is P. L. 87-228, commonly known
as the "Racketeers' Travel Act." This statute provides:
7. Sen. Rep. No. 141, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1951).
8. Id. at 13-14.
9. 64 Stat. 1134; 15 U.S.C. §§ 1171-1177 (1951).
10. Another statute concerned with gambling is the Act of October 20, 1951;
65 Stat. 529, 26 U.S.C. §§ 4401-4405, 4411-4414, 4421-4423, a taxing statute on
wagers which also did not achieve the results hoped for by its sponsors. It was
estimated that $400,000,000 in taxes would be collected under this Act. H. R.
REPORT No. 586, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 54 (1951). However, the largest annual
collection was $9,502,000 in 1953. SEN. REPORT No. 1310, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 32
(1962).
11. P.L. 87-197, 75 Stat. 466; P.L. 87-216, 75 Stat. 491; P.L. 87-218, 75 Stat.
492; P.L. 87-221, 75 Stat. 494; P.L. 87-228, 75 Stat. 498; P.L. 87-306, 75 Stat. 669;
P.L. 87-338, 75 Stat. 751; P.L. 87-342, 75 Stat. 757; P.L. 87-354, 75 Stat. 775; P.L.
87-368, 75 Stat. 795; P.L. 87-371, 75 Stat.- 802.
19631
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§ 1952. Interstate and foreign travel or transportation in
aid of racketeering enterprises.
(a) Whoever travels in interstate or foreign commerce
or uses any facility in interstate or foreign commerce in-
cluding the mail, with intent to--
(1) distribute the proceeds of any unlawful ac-
tivity; or
(2) commit any crime of violence to further any
unlawful activity; or
(3) otherwise promote, manage, establish, carry
on, or facilitate the promotion, management, establish-
ment, or carrying on, of any unlawful activity,
and thereafter performs or attempts to perform and of the
acts specified in subparagraphs (1), (2), and (3), shall be
fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than
five years, or both.
(b) As used in this section "unlawful activity" means
(1) any business enterprise involving gambling, liquor on
which the Federal excise tax has not been paid, narcotics,
or prostitution offenses in violation of the laws of the State
in which they are committed or of the United States, or (2)
extortion or bribery in violation of the laws of the State in
which committed or of the United States.
(c) Investigations of violations under this section in-
volving liquor or narcotics shall be conducted under the
supervision of the Secretary of the Treasury.
The Travel Act was submitted by the Department of Justice as one
of eight legislative proposals made by the Attorney General in April
1961, as part of a program to bring the full resources of the Federal
Government to the aid of state and local officials combating organ-
ized crime and racketeering. The primary purpose of the Act, as
explained by the Attorney General at that time and subsequently at
public hearings before committees of both Houses of Congress,' 2 was
to enable the Federal Government "to take effective action against
the racketeer who conducts an unlawful business, but lives far from
12. See Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Judiciary Com-
mittee on Legislation Relating to Organized Crime, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. [herein-
after House Hearings] 20-24 (1961); Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee on the Attorney General's Program to Curb Organized Crime and Racket-
eering, 87th Cong., lst Sess. [hereinafter Senate Hearings] 2-5, 15-17 (1961).
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the scene in comfort and safety."'1 3 Since the "kingpins" involved
in illegal gambling, liquor, narcotics, and prostitution enterprises
are often able to conduct their ventures by remote control, and make
only occasional supervisory visits to the scene of operations, they
may readily elude local law-enforcement agencies. Consequently, the
bill proposed by the Department of Justice focused on the interstate
travel of such individuals or their agents, rather than on their spe-
cific illegal revenue-producing practices.
As enacted, the statute makes criminal only a course of conduct in
which three elements are present: (1) interstate travel or use of any
facility in interstate commerce, (2) with an intent to engage in con-
duct which furthers an "unlawful activity" as defined in the statute,
(3) followed by the commission or attempt to commit one of the
enumerated acts which constitute the furtherance of an "unlawful
activity." While it is the illegally motivated crossing of a state
boundary which supplies the necessary Federal interest, the criminal
act is not completed until the person who has crossed the state line
or used the interstate facility commits some overt act in furtherance
of the illegal venture. This third element, which was added to the
draft submitted by the Department of Justice at the urging of sev-
eral members of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 14 was intended to
avert the criticism that the statute created crimes "out of intents...
unaccompanied by acts."'15
a. Is the "Travel Act" Constitutional?
The most frequently voiced constitutional objections to the statute
have been the following: (1) its language is unconstitutionally vague
and indefinite; (2) it is a restraint on the constitutionally assured
freedom of interstate travel; (3) it amounts to an unconstitutional
delegation of Federal legislative power to the States; (4) it exceeds
the constitutional power of the Federal Government over interstate
commerce. These objections were raised during the Congressional
hearings, 16 and are being asserted in several of the proceedings now
under way.
(1) Attacks based on alleged vagueness of the statute center on
section (a) (3), which brings within the Act anyone who travels with
intent to "promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate the
13. Senate Hearings, 15.
14. See the colloquy between Senators Ervin and Keating and the author at
Senate Hearings, 251-60.
15. Senate Hearings, 328 (remarks of Senator Ervin); see House Hearings,
162 (report of National Association of Defense Lawyers in Criminal Cases).
16. See, e.g., House Hearings, 178-80; Senate Hearings, 50-51.
1%3]
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promotion, management, establishment, or carrying on" of any of
the defined forms of "unlawful activity."
The decisions relating to claims of unconstitutional vagueness are
both plentiful and elusive.' 7 However, a recent formulation by the
Supreme Court sets forth the minimal constitutional requirement:
All that is required is that the language 'conveys sufficiently
definite warning as to the prescribed conduct when meas-
ured by common understanding and practices." s
The words "promote, manage, establish, carry on" have definite
meanings and are, no doubt, comprehensible in terms of common
understanding. They are similar to words used in other sections of
the Criminal Code' 9 and have well-established common meanings
which provide adequate warning as to the scope of prohibited
activity.
"Facilitation" covers more ground. Its use in the statute manifests
an intention to bring within the statutory prohibition any interstate
travel that furthers the proscribed illegal ventures. But, its breadth
alone does not make it unconstitutional. The word "facilitate" ap-
pears in other Federal criminal statutes and has been held sufficiently
definite to withstand constitutional attack. In Platt v. United
States20 the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the
statute authorizing forfeiture of vehicles used "to facilitate" the
transportation of contraband was constitutional. The statute was
applied in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the word in
17. For example, compare the statutory language held vague in United
States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921), with that of the test for
illegal restraint of trade sustained in Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1913).
For a full discussion of the Supreme Court's decisions in the area, see generally
Note, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960).
18. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 491 (1957), quoting from United
States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 8 (1947).
19. See, e.g., 63 Stat. 92, 18 U.S.C. § 1082 (1949) (making it a Federal crime
"to set up, operate, or own or hold any interest in any gambling ship"); 62 Stat.
772, 18 U.S.C. § 1582 (1948) (subjecting to criminal punishment one who "builds,
fits out, equips, loads, or otherwise prepares or sends away" a vessel for the
slave trade); 70 Stat. 623, 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1956) (criminal punishment if one
"organizes or helps or attempts to organize any society" to advocate violent
overthrow of government); 62 Stat. 813, 18 U.S.C. § 2424 (1948) (criminal sanc-
tions against one who "maintains, controls, supports, or harbors" an alien prosti-
tute without registering). In Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957), the
Supreme Court concluded that the word "organize" in 18 U.S.C. § 2385 meant
"establish." It was not even remotely suggested that this would make the statute
void for vagueness.
20. 163 F.2d 165 (10th Cir. 1947).
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United States v. One 1950 Chevrolet 4-Door Sedan.2 1 The everyday
meaning of "facilitate," which is the meaning given to it in the for-
feiture cases as well as in the narcotics cases, 2 2 is applicable to the
"Travel Act" as well. Consequently, it is reasonable and fair to read
the statute as imposing a criminal sanction on anyone who crosses
a state line with the intent of "making easy, or less difficult" the
"promotion, management, etc." of an "unlawful activity."
(2) The argument that the Travel Act is unconstitutional because
of its effect on the constitutionally assured freedom of interstate
travel2 3 was made belatedly after the Congressional hearings by the
American Civil Liberties Union. 2 4 Whether this objection would be
asserted to the statute in its enacted form is uncertain, since the
ACLU was careful to note that as then constituted, the Act pre-
scribed only two requisite elements-intent and the act of traveling.
Had the statute been passed as proposed by the Department of Jus-
tice, it would surely have come much closer to the argumentative
hypothetical posed by the Supreme Court in Caminetti v. United
States:
It may be conceded, for the purpose of the argument, that
Congress has no power to punish one who travels in inter-
state commerce merely because he has the intention of com-
mitting an illegal or immoral act at the conclusion of the
journey. 2 5
But Caminetti was not concerned with the scope of the "liberty"
of travel which was hinted at in Edwards v. California2 6 and elabo-
21. 215 F.2d 482, 484 (10th Cir. 1954). The court applied the definition in
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY: "To make easy, or less difficult or to free from
difficulty or impediment."
22. 21 U.S.C. 174 subjects to criminal punishment anyone who "facilitates
the transportation, concealment, or sale" of certain narcotics. "Facilitation" has
been broadly defined according to its common meaning in many cases. E.g., Pon
Wing Quong v. United States, 111 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1940); Rios v. United States,
283 F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1960); United States v. Santore, 290 F.2d 51, 77-78 (2d
Cir. 1960) (dictum), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 834 (1961); Jasso v. United States,
290 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 858.
23. Cf. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S.
116 (1958).
24. In its first memorandum to the Congressional committees considering
the proposed bill, the ACLU stated that it had "no objections on civil liberties
grounds" to the Travel Act. Senate Hearings, 47; House Hearings, 380. But on
July 11, 1961, it submitted a supplementary statement in which it raised the
present objection to the bill. Senate Hearings, 50; House Hearings, 385.
25. 242 U.S. 470, 491 (1917).
26. 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
1963"1
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rated upon in Kent v. Dulles.27 The Court in Caminetti focused upon
the scope of Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce and de-
cided simply that Congress was constitutionally authorized to regulate
"the movement in interstate commerce of.women and girls with a
view to the accomplishment of the unlawful purposes prohibited."' 28
Hence Caminetti, which was decided in an era when "interstate com-
merce" was defined more narrowly than it is today, appears irrelevant
to a proper consideration of the extent to which Congress may go
in restricting the freedom to travel across State lines.
Even assuming arguendo that the "liberty" of interstate travel
is as privileged constitutionally as is freedom of speech, that freedom
cannot be thought to extend to travel in furtherance of an illegal
scheme. Just as speech is not absolutely protected against all limi-
tations by the State,2 9 so, too, is interstate movement subject to
reasonable governmental restraint. Congress may surely say, as it
has done in the Fugitive Felon Act, 3 0 that the channels of inter-
state commerce are closed to one who seeks to use them to escape
prosecution for crimes he has committed in the past.3 1 Similarly, if
Congress decides to close these routes to one who intends to use
them to further criminal activity (with an additional overt act also
reauired), the reasonableness of such a course appears hardly open
to question.
To say that interstate travel is merely "an ordinary, innocent
act" 3 2 which should not be the subject of a criminal sanction is to
assume the very conclusion that is at issue. For if the travel is neces-
sary preparation for the execution of the illegal scheme, it is no more
an "ordinary, innocent act" than is speech'which induces the com-
mission of crime. If the latter may be punished as illegal incitement,
so may the former.
(3) In my opinion, the "delegation" challenge to the "Travel
Act" has little merit. Congress has no more "delegated" legislative
authority to the States by means of the "Travel Act" than it has
done with the Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. 13, which adopts
27. 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
28. 242 U.S. at 491.
29. But see the views of Mr. Justice Black reported in an interview, 37
N.Y. U. L. REv. 549 (1962).
30. 70 Stat. 100, 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1956).
31. See United States v. Miller, 17 F. Supp. 65 (W.D. Ky., 1936). See also
63 Stat. 94, 18 U.S.C. § 1231 (1949), which makes it a crime to transport "any
person who is employed or who is to be employed" as a strike-breaker in inter-
state commerce.
32. House Hearings, 162 (report of National Association of Defense Lawyers
in Criminal cases).
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state laws in certain areas within Federal jurisdiction and has been
held constitutional. 3 3 Indeed, the delegation in the "Travel Act" is
less substantial than that in the Assimilative Crimes Act, both be-
cause the "Travel Act" is restricted to certain defined kinds of crim-
inal activity and because it does not, as does the Assimilative Crimes
Act, turn what is otherwise a State crime ipso facto into a Federal
violation. What the 'Travel Act" does is close the channels of inter-
state commerce to those who would commit one of the defined State
crimes. Consequently, to avoid committing a Federal offense, an in-
dividual need only refrain from using interstate commerce facilities
in carrying out the venture which is illegal under State law.
In this respect the "Travel Act" is similar to the Fugitive Felon
Act, which also subjects to the Federal criminal laws State felons
who utilize interstate facilities to evade justice. The "delegation"
argument, inter alia, has been termed "unsound" by the Sixth Cir-
cuit when it was made by a defendant who had been convicted under
the Fugitive Felon Act, as it then stood. 3 4
(4) The Fugitive Felon Act, as well as other Federal criminal stat-
utes, also suggests the refutation to the argument that the "Travel
Act" exceeds Congress' power under the Interstate Commerce Clause.
In 1913, the Supreme Court held that the Mann Act's prohibition
against transport of women in interstate commerce for immoral pur-
poses was a permissible Congressional regulation of interstate com-
merce. 3 5 The Court noted that "Congress has power over transpor-
tation 'among the several States,' " so that if individuals "employ
interstate transportation as a facility of their wrongs, it may be for-
bidden them to the extent of the [Mann Act]. '" 3 6 In 1937, a Georgia
District Court sustained the Fugitive Felon Act against a similar
constitutional attack. 3 7 The Court said unequivocally:
The passage of a person from one state to another is inter-
state commerce within the meaning of the Constitution and
the enactment by Congress of a statute making it a federal
offense to do so for the purpose of escaping prosecution for
a crime is within the power of Congress. 38
33. Franklin v. United States, 216 U.S. 559 (1910) (State law in force at
time of Federal enactment); United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286 (1958)
(State law enacted subsequent to Federal enactment).
34. Hemans v. United States, 163 F.2d 228, 239 (6th Cir. 1947), cert. denied,
332 US.. 801 (1947).
35. Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913).
36. 227 U.S. at 323.
37. Simmons v. Zerbst, 18 F. Supp. 929 (N.D. Ga. 1937). See also Lupino
v. United States, 185 F. Supp. 363 (D. Minn. 1960); Azzone v. United States,
190 F. Supp. 376 (D. Minn. 1961).
38. 18 F. Supp. at 930.
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With the definition of "interstate commerce" expanding as it has in
the past twenty-five years, it hardly seems likely that any court could
find it beyond the scope of Congress' regulating power to close the
channels of interstate traffic to those who seek to use it for an un-
lawful end.
b. Which Interstate Movements Are Covered?
As originally recommended by the Department of Justice, the Act
would have covered only interstate travel. At the urging of Senator
Keating, the Senate Judiciary Committee added a second section to
the bill to include "transportation" in commerce. 3 9 In the House of
Representatives the two sections were merged, so that the Act now
applies to anyone who "travels in interstate or foreign commerce or
uses any facility in interstate or foreign commerce, including the
mail."
Attack has been made on the scope of this portion of the statute
based on the House's omission of the words "for transportation"
following the word "facility." While it seems most clear that had
the Senate version been enacted, the Act would have been limited
to interstate transportation facilities, 4 0 the plain meaning of the
present law encompasses communication facilities-such as tele-
graph, radio and telephone-as well. Whether the simple omission
of the two words (which could just as readily have been retained
had the House and the conferees intended to keep the narrower
scope of the bill passed by the Senate) should be taken as an indi-
cation that use of interstate communication facilities is covered
is a difficult question of divining legislative intent. 4 1 The inter-
pretation of the "Travel Act" along these lines is made somewhat
more complicated by the fact that Congress simultaneously enacted
39. The added section was identical to the "travel" section of the bill except
that instead of the words "whoever travels in interstate or foreign commerce,"
it substituted, "whoever uses any facility for transportation in interstate or for-
eign commerce, including the mails."
40. This appears clearly from the language of the bill as well as from re-
marks made by Senator Keating on the floor of the Senate. He called attention
to the fact that a bill he had proposed "would also apply to any interstate com-
merce facilities. It would not be limited to travel, transportation and the mail."
Daily Cong. Rec. 12940 (July 28, 1961).
41. Balanced against the ease with which the restrictive language could
have been retained is the language in the House report, H. R. Rep. No. 966, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1961), which refers to the consolidated clause as prohibiting
"the use of other interstate transportation facilities, including the mail." And
the Conference Report, H. R Rep. No. 1161, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1961), noted
merely that the House version of the bill, which was agreed to in this matter,
"combined these two separate sections into a single section." There was no sug-
gestion that a substantive change had been made.
[Vol. 1 : p. 181
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the wire-communication statute, 18 U.S.C. 1084, which makes it a
Federal offense for anyone "engaged in the business of betting or
wagering" knowingly to use "a wire communication facility for the
transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of bets or wagers or
information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on any sport-
ing event or contest."
Interpretation of the "Travel Act" to cover telephone and telegraph
transmissions not only conforms to the usual dictionary meaning of
"facility" but also serves to reinforce and supplement the wire-
communication statute. 4 2 The Department of Justice maintains that
the phrase "information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers"
in the wire-communication statute should be broadly construed to
reflect the realities of different types of illegal gambling operations.
Under such a construction, the list of information whose transmission
would be prohibited when the other requirements of the Act are met
would include, with respect to horse or dog racing, advance odds,
track conditions, and jockey changes. Also included would be the
results of prior races, since this transmission of the results would
permit the better or bookmaker to ascertain the amount of money
available for wagering on subsequent races and thereby assists in the
placing of bets or wagers. A fortiori, the transmission of such infor-
mation is within the "Travel Act," which requires only that the trans-
mission "facilitate the promotion, management, establishment, or
carrying on" of the unlawful gambling activity. It is, of course, pos-
sible that the courts may interpret the wire-communication statute
more narrowly than the Department urges, in which case the prohibi-
tions of the "Travel Act" may be the only means of penalizing par-
ticular uses of interstate wire facilities as an adjunct to illegal gam-
bling.4 3
c. What Renders the Interstate Travel or Transportation Illegal?
In addition to crossing of a state boundary, the potential violator of
the "Travel Act" must have a specific intent to commit one of the
enumerated acts in the destination State and must, thereafter, per-
42. The term "facility" has been broadly defined in other contexts. See,
e.g., Hartford Electric Co. v. FPC, 131 F.2d 953, 961 (2d Cir. 1942); Briggs Mfg.
Co. v. United States, 30 F.2d 962, 964 (D. Conn. 1929); Corona Coal Co. v. United
States, 21 F.2d 489 (D. Ala. 1927).
43. Several indictments have been returned since September 13, 1961, which
raise the question whether wire communications are covered by Section 1952. On
November 17, 1962 in the District Court for the Western District of Washington
a conviction was obtained in United States v. John A. Wicklund, d/b/a Turf
Smoke Shop, Inc. (Crim. No. 50522) under Section 1952 for the transmission of
information by a Western Union sports ticker which was used in conjunction
with illegal gambling.
1963]
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form such an act or attempt to perform it. Only if all three elements
are proved can he be convicted under the statute.
The list of prohibited acts encompasses nearly all activity that fur-
thers a racketeering venture. Although two of the most common pur-
poses for which interstate travel may be used are listed, (distributing
the proceeds of the unlawful activity and committing a crime of vio-
lence to further any unlawful activity), section (a) (3) is a "catch-
all" which brings under coverage of the law, travel with any intent
to "facilitate" the "carrying on" of the racketeering enterprise. While
it is posible that the final distribution of proceeds at the termination
of an illegal venture may not "facilitate" its "promotion, manage-
ment, establishment, or carrying on," the commission of a crime of
violence "to further" an unlawful activity seems necessarily to con-
stitute an attempt to "facilitate" its "management" or "carrying on."
Hence, it is unnecessary to determine precisely what constitutes a
"crime of violence," though it is imperative, if the primary purpose
of the Act is to be carried out,4 4 to construe "distribute" as including
the delivery of all proceeds to a single individual.
The broad term "facilitate" brings within the reach of the Act
even the most remote purposive connection between the interstate
movement and the effect on the illegal activity. In a bookmaking
operation, for example, it would include travel or use of an inter-
state facility to accept wagers, pay off winners, pay salaries of em-
ployees, pay rent for premises, purchase equipment for use in the
business, advertise the enterprise, procure odds or results on an event
upon which bets are contemplated or taken, keep records of wagers,
obtain telephone service, use banking facilities, or hire employees. The
conduct need not have the degree of importance and direct connection
which is required for a charge of aiding and abetting a direct offend-
er's criminal act.4 5
The statute also demands proof of the third element-the overt
act-but does not require that it grow out of, or be causally related
to, the intent with which the interstate movement is executed. In
other words, a gambler living in California, who has a gambling
establishment in Kentucky where gambling is illegal, may violate
the statute by traveling from California to Kentucky in order to
murder a gambling competitor in Kentucky, even if he thereafter
changes his mind and merely takes advantage of his stay in Ken-
tucky to supervise the way his gambling establishment is being
44. See text at note 12, supra (statement of the Attorney General); H. R.
Rep. No. 966, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1961).
45. See United States v. Santore, 290 F.2d 63, (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
365 U.S. 834 (1961).
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conducted. The Senate report, discussing this addition to the
Department of Justice's recommendation, says only that the pur-
pose of the amendment "is to provide that to come within the
provisions of the bill, some activity in furtherance of a racketeering
enterprise, subsequent to the performance of the travel, must take
place and that accordingly the gravamen of the offense will be travel
and a further overt act to aid the enterprise. 4 6 Even this interpre-
tation, which does not require that the overt act be related to the
prior interstate travel, goes beyond a bare literal reading of the
statute. For the terms of the law would warrant prosecution not
only if the overt act was unrelated to the interstate movement, but
also if the act related to one racketeering venture and the travel to
another.
To date, the Department of Justice has not undertaken any pros-
ecutions where the overt act has not been related to the interstate
movement, either as a step in exceuting the purpose for which the
movement was undertaken or as a coordinate measure in a single
plan, but the statute and the legislative history appear clearly to au-
thorize such a course.
d. Which Racketeering Enterprise8 Are Covered?
The Act does not purport to reach all interstate travel by those en-
gaged in racketeering. 4 7 It focuses on four specific "business enter-
prises" and two illegal practices commonly engaged in by racketeers.
Only if the interstate movement is done in order to further one of
these ventures, and if the subsequent overt act also relates to an
"unlawful activity" as statutorily defined, is the conduct criminal.
With respect to gambling, narcotics, or prostitution ventures, the
statute prescribes two elements that must be proved to satisfy the
definition of "unlawful activity." First, the venture must amount to
a "business enterprise." This is because the statute is directed at
organized crime, at "a continuous course of conduct sufficient for it
to be termed a business enterprise," and not at "the sporadic, casual
46. Sen. Rep. No. 644, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1961).
47. The word "racketeering" does not appear in the text of the Act,
although it is in the official "analysis" in the Criminal Code and was included in
earlier working drafts of the Department of Justice's proposal and in the draft
bills that were introduced in prior sessions of Congress. Senator Case of New
Jersey introduced a similar bill in the Eighty-Sixth Congress, which would have
made it a crime to travel in interstate or foreign commerce or use a communica-
tion facility in interstate or foreign commerce to further a "racketeering enter-
prise." S. 3908, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960). Several other bills introduced in the
Eighty-Sixth Congress sought to make Federal crimes of conspiracies or attempts
to commit "racketeering" offenses. See H. R. 5186; H. R. 5702; H. R. 5796; H. R.
7129, all in the 86th Congress, 1st Session.
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involvement in these offenses." 48 Neither the social poker game nor
the sporadic use of narcotics can constitute the "unlawful activity"
described in the "Travel Act". Although the term "business enterprise"
may seem somewhat indefinite, similar phrases have been employed
in other contexts in Federal legislation. For example, the wagering
tax imposed on those "engaged in the business of accepting wag-
ers" 4 9 has been construed as including those who are only inciden-
tally engaged in accepting wagers 5 0 and those whose customers are
limited in number.5 1 And the provision of the tax law requiring a
bond of "every person intending to commence or to continue the
business of a distiller" 5 2 has been said to relate to "a word of common
usage which needed no formal definition."' 5 3
The second element which must be proved to turn a gambling,
narcotics, or prostitution scheme into an "unlawful activity" within
the meaning of the "Travel Act" is a violation of State or Federal
law. In other words, the "business enterprise" must involve illegal
conduct. A program to establish a gambling casino in Las Vegas,
Nevada, would not amount to "unlawful activity." Since a substan-
tial number of Federal laws relating to gambling, 54 narcotics, 5 5 or
48. Testimony of the Attorney General before the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee, Senate Hearing, 16, quoted in S. Rep. No. 644, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 3
(1961). See also H. R. Rep. No. 966, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1961).
49. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, §4411, 4401 (c).
50. United Sta:tes v. Simon, 241 F.2d 308 (7th Cir. 1957); see Hodoh v.
United States, 153 F. Supp. 822 (N. D. Ohio, 1957).
51. Kahn v. United States, 251 F.2d 160 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 356 U.S. 918
(1918).
52. 26 U.S.C. 5173.
53. Ramsey v. United States, 245 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1957).
54. 63 Stat. 92, 18 U.S.C. § 1082 (1949) (gambling ships); 63 Stat. 92, 18
U.S.C. § 1083 (1949) (transportation between shore and ship); 75 Stat. 491, 18
U.S.C. § 1084 (1961) (transmission of wagering information); 62 Stat. 762, 18
U.S.C. § 1301 (1948) (importing or transporting lottery tickets); 65 Stat. 761,
18 U.S.C. § 1302 (1951) (mailing lottery tickets or wagering paraphernalia);
62 Stat. 763, 18 U.S.C. § 1303 (1948) (postmaster or employee as lottery agent);
62 Stat. 763, 18 U.S.C. § 1304 (1948) (broadcasting lottery information); 75 Stat.
492, 18 U.S.C. § 1953 (1961) (transportation of wagering paraphernalia); 62 Stat.
686, 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1948) (Assimilative Crimes Act); 75 Stat. 1304, 26 U.S.C.
§ 4401 (1958) (excise tax upon wagers); 68A Stat. 527, 26 U.S.C. § 4411 (1954)
(occupational wagering tax).
55. 70 Stat. 572, 18 U.S.C. § 1402 (1956) (failure to surrender heroin);
70 Stat. 573, 18 U.S.C. § 1403 (1956) (use of communications facilities in narcotics
offenses); 70 Stat. 574, 18 U.S.C. § 1407 (1956) (border crossings-narcotics
addicts and violators); 70 Stat. 574, 18 U.S.C. § 1406 (1956) (immunity of wit-
nesses in proceedings involving narcotics offenses); 21 U.S.C. 173-191 (import or
export of narcotic drugs); 74 Stat. 61, 21 U.S.C. §§ 505, 515 (1960) (offenses
relating to the manufacture of narcotic drugs); 68 Stat. 79, 42 U.S.C. § 261
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prostitution 5 6 could apply to racketeering activity in these areas,
they may sometimes be used in place of State statutes. Of course,
if the overt act itself violates Federal law, the act, instead of the prior
travel, may become the basis of a Federal prosecution.
With respect to illegal liquor ventures, the original draft sub-
mitted by the Department of Justice would have required the same
two elements as are necessary to prove "unlawful activity" respect-
ing gambling, narcotics, or prostitution. However, the Senate Com-
mittee feared that if violations of State liquor laws involving liquor
upon which the Federal excise tax had been paid could be turned
into Federal offenses if a state boundary is crossed prior to the illegal
act, too many minor infractions would become Federal concerns. 
5 7
Consequently, the Act provides that illegal liquor enterprises con-
stitute "unlawful activity" only if the federal excise tax has not been
paid on the liquor.5 s
The remaining types of illegal conduct which may amount to "un-
lawful activity" within the meaning of the Travel Act are extortion
and bribery. Here there is no requirement that the venture constitute
a "business enterprise," nor need the extortion or bribery be related
(1954) (introduction of narcotics into hospitals); 64 Stat. 427, 49 U.S.C. § 781
(1950) (carriage of contraband in vessel, vehicle or aircraft); 70 Stat. 568, 26
U.S.C. § 7237 (1956) (violations of laws relating to narcotics and to marihuana).
56. 63 Stat. 96, 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1948) (transportation for prostitution
purposes); 62 Stat. 812, 18 U.S.C. § 2422 (1948) (coercion or enticement of
female for prostitution purposes); 62 Stat. 812, 18 U.S.C. § 2423 (1948) (coer-
cion or enticement of minor female for prostitution purposes); 62 Stat. 813, 18
U.S.C. § 2424 (1948) (filing factual statement about alien female prostitute).
57. See S. Rep. No. 644, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1961). The House Commit-
tee was also concerned over this possibility. Congressman Celler, Chairman of the
Committee, for example, suggested that as originally drafted, the bill would make
it a Federal crime for the owner of a liquor store to go from Washington, D. C.,
into Maryland with the intention of keeping his store open beyond the closing
hour prescribed by Maryland law. House Hearings, 35. However, the House re-
stored the bill to its original form, and it was not until conference that the
House receded and accepted the Senate version. H. R. Rep. No. 1161, 87th Cong.,
1st Sess. 3 (1961).
58. These are found in the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C., in the follow-
ing sections: 5001-5012 (distilled spirits); 5021-5028 (rectification); 5041-5045
(wine); 5051-5057 (beer); 5061-5065 (administrative provisions); 5601 (unlawful
rectifying or bottling of distilled spirits); 5602 (penalty for tax fraud by distiller);
5607 (penalty for unlawful use, recovery or concealment of denatured distilled
spirits or articles); 5646 (penalty for evasion of distilled spirits tax); 5661
(penalty for violation of laws and regulations relating to wine); 5671 (penalty for
evasion of beer tax and fraudulent noncompliance with requirements); 5684
(penalties relating to the payment and collection of liquor taxes); 5685 (penalty
relating to possession of devices for emitting smoke, gas, etc., and possession of
explosives and firearms, when violating liquor laws); 5686 (penalty for having,
possessing or using liquor or property intended to be or having been, used in
violating the provisions of this chapter).
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to any gambling, liquor, narcotics or prostitution offense. 5 9 Any ex-
tortion or bribery in violation of State or Federal law 60 is enough.
e. How Can the Leading Racketeers Be Prosecuted?
Obviously, the top racketeers who live far from the site of their
criminal activities will seldom engage in the interstate travel them-
selves, though they may more readily be subject to prosecution for
use of communications facilities under the Act. Such errands as the
distribution of proceeds and other day-to-day management functions
are ordinarily assumed by those who stand lower in the racketeering
hierarchy. But an essential aid in the administration of the "Travel
Act" is the Criminal Code's general aider-and-abettor provision. 6 1
Since an individual who "commands" or "procures" the commission
of a crime is thereby rendered a principal, the chief, whose order
the courier is carrying out, may be made a co-defendant with his
agent. 6 2
59. As first passed by the House, the act would have covered extortion and
bribery only "in connection with" the gambling, liquor, narcotics, or prostitution
offenses previously listed. This limiting amendment was "strongly opposed" by
the Department of Justice for the following reason:
It eliminated from the purview of the bill extortions not related to the
four above offenses but which are, and have historically been, activities
which involve organized crime. Such activities as the "shakedown
racket," "shylocking" (where interest of 20% per week is charged and
which is collected by means of force and violence, since in most states
the loans are uncollectible in court), and labor extortion. It also re-
moves from the purview of the bill the bribery of state, local and federal
officials by the organized criminals unless we can prove that the bribery
is directly attributable to gambling, liquor, narcotics or prostitution.
Letter from the Deputy Attorney General to the Chairman, House Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, August 7, 1961.
The Senate version was then adopted in conference. H. R. Rep. No. 1161, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1961).
60. Federal extortion statutes include 18 U.S.C. §§ 871-877, (1951); 19
U.S.C. § 60 (extortion by customs officer); 26 U.S.C. § 7212 (attempt to inter-
fere with administration of internal revenue laws); 26 U.S.C. § 7214 (offenses by
revenue officers or agents). Federal bribery statutes include 18 U.S.C. §§ 152,
201-223; 7 U.S.C. § 85 (bribery of a meat grader); 7 U.S.C. § 60 (bribery of
person licensed under the Cotton Standards Act); 21 U.S.C. § 90 (bribery in con-
nection with meat inspection laws); 27 U.S.C. §§ 205, 207 (commercial bribery
in connection with sale of intoxicating liquors); 29 U.S.C. § 186 (Taft-Hartley
Act restrictions on payments to employee representatives); 33 U.S.C. § 447
(bribery of inspector, deputy or employee of office of supervisor of designated
ports); 46 U.S.C. § 239(i) (bribery of marine casualty witnesses); 47 U.S.C.
§ 509(a) (2) (bribery of radio contest participant); 49 U.S.C. § 1 (17) (bribery
of railroad employee).
61. 18 U.S.C. § 2.
62. Another available tool is the general conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371,
under which all the participants to an agreement to send one individual across a
State line in violation of the "Travel Act" could be prosecuted.
[Vol. 1 : p. 181
THE TRAVEL ACT
CONCLUSION
The passage of the "Travel Act" and the other anti-crime proposals
of the Department of Justice had an immediate effect in curtailing
illegal gambling across the country. Wire services closed down and
bookies found it difficult, in some cases impossible, to "lay off" bets.
As a result of a survey conducted by Sports Illustrated in its issue
of September 3, 1962, that publication pointed out that "bookmakers
all over the country are up against it as they have never been before."
In the fourteen months since its enactment on Septemfer 13, 1961,
some 28 indictments against 102 individuals have been filed under
the "Travel Act." Three cases have ended with pleas of guilty, and
convictions after trial have been obtained in five instances. Three
cases have been dismissed by the Courts on non-constitutional
grounds. At least four District Courts in unreported orders have re-
jected defense motions challenging the constitutionality of the statute.
Although the constitutional question and many legal issues concerning
the application of the statute await authoritative court decision, the
statute has already demonstrated its usefulness as an indispensable
tool for prosecuting organized illegal ventures which might other-
wise be beyond the reach of law enforcement agencies.
Not the least of the "Travel Act's" effects is the expansion it oc-
casions in the investigative jurisdiction of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. When there is reason to suspect that interstate travel,
transportation, or communication is involved in an otherwise local
racketeering enterprise, the FBI is now authorized to put its forces
to work. The difficulty faced by local law enforcement agencies con-
fronted with major racketeering ventures need hardly be elaborated.
The "Travel Act," a statute which "local law enforcement officials
need,"'6 3 is a major step in Federal cooperation not only because it
enables the Federal Government to put racketeers in jail, but also
because it pits against their considerable resources the formidable
investigative arms of the United States Government.
63. Testimony of the Attorney General, House Heavrings, 24.
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